Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous, in Opposition to Sceptics and Atheists
Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous, in Opposition to Sceptics and Atheists
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the ground there is for distinguishing between them, which I now plainly see. And it is this: because intense heat is nothing else but a particular kind of painful sensation; and pain cannot exist but in a perceiving being; it follows that no intense heat can really exist in an unperceiving corporeal substance. But this is no reason why we should deny heat in an inferior degree to exist in such a substance.
PHIL. But how shall we be able to discern those degrees of heat which exist only in the mind from those which exist without it?
HYL. That is no difficult matter. You know the least pain cannot exist unperceived; whatever, therefore, degree of heat is a pain exists only in the mind. But, as for all other degrees of heat, nothing obliges us to think the same of them.
PHIL. I think you granted before that no unperceiving being was capable of pleasure, any more than of pain.
HYL. I did.
PHIL. And is not warmth, or a more gentle degree of heat than what causes uneasiness, a pl
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